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The reasonable person is an important and ubiquitous fig-
ure in the law. Despite the seeming handicap of being a hypo-
thetical construct assembled by lawyers rather than a flesh-and-
blood person, he (for most of Western legal history) or she (in 
more recent times) determines such varied legal and factual mat-
ters as the standard of care for negligence liability, 1 the material-
ity of misrepresentations in both contrace and tort,3 the applica-
bility of hearsay exceptions for admissions against interest,4 the 
scope of liability for workplace harassment under Title VII,5 the 
clarity of law necessary to defeat the qualified immunity of gov-
ernment officials,6 and the custodial status of suspects for pur-
poses of Miranda. 7 To carry out these myriad tasks, the reason-
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1. See 57 A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 7 (2005) ("Negligence consists of acting 
other than as a reasonable person would do in the circumstances."). 
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981) ("A misrepre-
sentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his 
assent."). 
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977) (explaining that a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is material if "a reasonable man would attach importance 
to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question."). 
4. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) (a statement is not excludable as hearsay if it is "so 
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to sub-
ject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant 
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have 
made the statement unless believing it to be true."). 
5. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 131 (2004) ("A hostile-
environment constructive discharge claim entails ... working conditions so intolerable 
that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign."). 
6. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("Government officials per-
forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). 
7. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) ("Custody must be de-
termined based on a how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive 
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able person must understand community norms of care in some 
settings, apply customary trade practices in others, and grasp 
principles of legal interpretation in yet others. The reasonable 
person constructed by the law is capable of assuming many 
guises and performing many functions. 
We focus here on one particularly significant, and signifi-
cantly underappreciated, legal function of the reasonable person: 
The reasonable American person of 17888 determines, for 1788 
and today, the meaning of the federal Constitution. Thus, when 
interpreting the Constitution,9 the touchstone is not the specific 
thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people-
whether drafters, ratifiers, or commentators, however distin-
guished and significant within the drafting and ratification proc-
ess they may have been-but rather the hypothetical under-
standings of a reasonable person who is artificially constructed 
by lawyers. The thoughts of historical figures may be relevant to 
the ultimate inquiry, but the ultimate inquiry is legal. 
Ever since 1986, when then-Judge Antonin Scalia articu-
lated the distinction between original intent, i.e., the subjective 
thoughts of historically concrete drafters and/or ratifiers, and 
original meaning, i.e., the meaning that a reasonable person 
would attribute to textual langua9e, 10 modern originalists have 
moved steadily towards the latter. 1 But although the weight of 
his circumstances."). 
8. At least parts of the Constitution became an operative legal instrument on June 
21, 1788. The other parts became operative in stages to which it is more difficult to apply 
a specific date. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become 
Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001). 
9. The same analysis may or may not apply to other legal instruments, such as 
state constitutions; we leave that inquiry to others. We discuss the problem of post-1788 
amendments to the Constitution infra text at 36--39. 
10. In a speech delivered at the Department of Justice on June 14, 1986, approxi-
mately three months before he took his seat on the Supreme Court on September 26, 
1986, Judge Scalia urged originalists to "change the label from the Doctrine of Original 
Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning." Antonin Scalia, Speech Before the Attor-
ney General's Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING: A SOURCEBOOK 106 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1987). Profes-
sor Lawson attended that speech and recalls that shortly after Judge Scalia made his rec-
ommendation, T. Kenneth Cribb, the Counselor to the Attorney General, taped a hand-
written sign to the podium saying something to the effect of "So stipulated." That event, 
juxtaposed with Judge Scalia's promotion to the Supreme Court, is a convenient marker 
of the formal ascendancy of the doctrine of original meaning in modern times. 
11. Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia-arguably the most visible figures in the mod-
ern rise of originalism-have both endorsed reliance upon the reasonable person in con-
stitutional interpretation, statutory interpretation, or both. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) ("What 
the [constitutional] ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be 
what the public of the time would have understood the terms to mean .... The search is 
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originalist opinion today supports the view that the Constitu-
tion's meaning is to be found in the hypothetical mind of the rea-
sonable person,12 there is not yet a persuasive, systematic de-
fense of this claim nor a clear indication of how one determines 
the characteristics and interpretative proclivities of this imagi-
nary yet crucial figure. We hope to fill that gap here. In the 
process, we hope to vindicate the paramount role of lawyers in 
constitutional interpretation- a role that is seriously threatened 
by virtually all other originalist (and many nonoriginalist) inter-
pretative methodologies that locate constitutional meaning in 
sources that are beyond the peculiar competence of lawyers to 
uncover. 
In Part I of this article, we identify the considerations that 
point generally towards the use of hypothetical rather than his-
torical mental states as the sources of constitutional meaning. 
The relevant considerations include the Constitution's own 
terms and structure, the nature of the Constitution's actual au-
thorship and readership, and the social facts that made the Con-
stitution authoritative in practice. Most tellingly, the Constitu-
tion itself identifies its author as "We the People of the United 
States,',~ 3 which is clearly a legal fiction rather than an historical 
fact. The Constitution specifically requests that it be understood 
by reference to a hypothetical rather than historically real author 
or group of authors. 
In Part II we introduce the laborious task of describing the 
characteristics of this hypothetical "We the People of the United 
States." How smart and reasonable is this legally-constructed 
person, and what assumptions does he or she bring to the inter-
not for a subjective intention."); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997) (stating that originalists "look for a sort of 
'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the 
law.") (emphasis added). Similar thoughts have been voiced by an all-star roster of 
originalist scholars. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92-100 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 
552 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 65 (1988); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 
1127-48 (2003); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1493-95 (2005). 
12. There are notable dissenters who continue to focus on concrete historical inten-
tions. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36 (1999); Richard S. Kay, Ad-
herence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and 
Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 246 (1988) 
13. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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pretative enterprise? To complete this task would require us to 
set forth a complete theory of interpretation, and that is not our 
goal here. But we do mean to suggest the direction for further 
research and to provide enough material to allow the enterprise 
of interpretation to go forward in most cases. At a minimum, we 
show that the hypothetical "We the People of the United States" 
bears a striking resemblance to the reasonable person familiar to 
lawyers. 
In Part III, we explain how the reasonable person's central 
role in constitutional interpretation has important consequences 
for the roles of various experts and specialists in the interpreta-
tive enterprise. In particular, we show that our approach sug-
gests a much more important role for lawyers and legal scholars 
in constitutional interpretation than is implied by many other in-
terpretative theories. If, for example, the key to constitutional 
interpretation is to identify the mental states of specific historical 
individuals, then determining constitutional meaning would 
properly be the province of experts in identifying those mental 
states; the most obvious candidates for expertise in this area 
would be historians, psychologists, and linguists. The task of le-
gal professionals under this approach would most sensibly be to 
marshal and channel those experts, in much the way that lawyers 
must marshal and channel experts to prove medical malpractice 
liability or antitrust damages. Under an originalist approach that 
searches for actual historical intentions, in which meaning is an 
historical, psychological, and linguistic fact, legal analysis is ap-
propriately the handmaiden of historical, psychological, and lin-
guistic scholarship. By the same token, if constitutional meaning 
results from moral values, evolving social norms, or other com-
mon "nonoriginalist" sources, then the spotlight shifts to moral 
philosophers, sociologists, or pollsters. Again, there is no obvi-
ous reason to privilege lawyers or legal scholars in this kind of 
search for meaning. 
If, however, constitutional meaning depends upon a distinc-
tively legal construct such as the reasonable person, as we main-
tain, then determining constitutional meaning is more properly 
the province of legal experts. The people best able to glean the 
legally-constructed thoughts of a legally-constructed person are 
likely to be lawyers and legal scholars. Historians, psychologists, 
and linguists may have something, and even much, to contribute 
to this legal enterprise, but constitutional interpretation remains 
a distinctively legal, rather than a distinctively historical, linguis-
tic, or psychological, task. Under reasonable-person originalism 
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(as we term our interpretative approach), historical and other 
scholarship is appropriately the handmaiden of legal analysis. 
Our analysis therefore validates, and is validated by, more than 
two centuries of practice, under which lawyers have generally 
been recognized as significant, if not the predominant, actors in 
constitutional interpretation. This practice is difficult to explain 
under any other plausible originalist approach. 
The Constitution is a legal document. It should not be sur-
prising that a legal document is best construed through legal 
means. 
I. THE HYPOTHETICAL OBSERVER DEFENDED 
A. "WE MUST NEVER FORGET, THAT IT Is A 
CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING" 14 
Many trees have been felled so that academics can debate 
theories of meaning, constitutional and otherwise. Those debates 
range broadly across epistemology, the philosophy of language, 
literary theory, linguistics, semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, and 
probably a large number of "-ics" of which neither of us has ever 
heard.15 To paraphrase an ex-President, much of the debate de-
pends upon what the meaning of "meaning" is. 16 
We have neither the ability nor the desire to enter this 
thicket. We are humble lawyers, with nary an advanced degree 
in any other discipline between us. Indeed, a central goal of this 
article is to vindicate the role of lawyers in constitutional inter-
pretation, and if one must be an expert in a wide variety of "-ics" 
in order intelligently to engage in such an activity, that is very 
bad news both for our project and for lawyers in general. 
Fortunately, it turns out-or so we believe-that interpret-
ing the federal Constitution is considerably easier than interpret-
ing the writings of John Milton or uncovering the true character 
of indexicals. The Constitution is a document of a certain kind, 
and only a subset of the theoretically possible methods of assign-
14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
15. For brief glimpses into this world, see LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Symposium, What Is Legal Interpreta-
tion?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 461-733 (2005). 
16. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE REAL WORLD 139-41 (1998); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate versus Strong Inten-
tionalism: Knapp and Michaels Revisited, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669,670-72 (2005). 
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ing meaning to words makes sense for such a document. A gen-
eralist legal education cannot train one to be a Milton scholar or 
a philosopher of language, but it can train one to participate use-
fully in a constitutional dialogue. 
The federal Constitution is not a poem, a novel (chain or 
otherwise), a manifesto, or a treatise. The federal Constitution is 
a blueprint-an instruction manual, if you will-for a particular 
form of government. It is possible to try to describe the Constitu-
tion in other terms-for example, as "a principal symbol of, per-
haps the principal symbol of, the aspirations of the tradition," 17 
as a mechanism for effecting "a transition from today's nonideal 
world to the better world of our vision," 18 or as "that set of be-
liefs, or whatever, that has some hold on our behavior, our be-
liefs, and our collective and individual identity" 19 -and any of 
these descriptions may be accurate (as Obi Wan-Kenobi might 
put it) from a particular point of view. But they are accurate in 
the same respect, and from roughly the same point of view, that 
it can be accurate to describe the Empire State Building as a 
mountain rather than a building.Z0 The actual authors of the 
17. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 564 (1985). 
18. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 816 
(1989). 
19. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCfiNG THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 309 (1994). 
20. Strictly speaking, to call the Empire State Building a "building" presupposes a 
conceptual framework into which the Empire State Building fits. The basic purpose of 
concepts-and of words that reduce abstractions to concrete symbols-is to allow a con-
scious person to organize the world that he or she perceives and thus better enable that 
person to deal with a complex reality. How one organizes the world depends upon the 
purposes and context of that organization. In a world in which large artificial structures 
are commonplace, it is important to have the concept of a "building," and the Empire 
State Building is likely to fit nicely into any such conceptual scheme. But for someone 
who has never experienced an artificial shelter, the Empire State Building may seem 
more like a mountain, and in that person's cognitive context, it may make more sense to 
say that the Empire State Building is a mountain than that it is a building. As that person 
acquires more experience with entities that resemble the Empire State Building, the cog-
nitive context will shift, and perhaps the concept of "building" will quickly become epis-
temologically indispensable. But if the proper characterization of the Empire State 
Building depends on the context of a specific observer, how can one make strong claims 
about the entity's status as a "building"? 
America from the late eighteenth century to the present has not contained very 
many people for whom it would be epistemologically appropriate to call the Empire 
State Building a mountain. In that particular historical and social context, it is perfectly 
sensible, and indeed epistemologically mandatory, to say that the Empire State Building 
is a building. It is true that in order to make the statement "The Empire State Building is 
a building" true in the strongest possible sense, one would need to specify quite carefully 
the cognitive context in which that statement is made and the qualifications required by 
the context. But explicitly to add those qualifications to every statement and judgment 
that we make would be a royal pain in the tush, and we all have lives to lead. Accord-
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Constitution viewed it as an instruction manual for a form of 
government. The actual readers of the Constitution during the 
time of its creation viewed it as an instruction manual for a form 
of government. And the Constitution on its face presents itself to 
the world as an instruction manual for a form of government. It 
is simply too dry, technical, and boring to be anything else.21 
B. "WE MUST NEVER FORGET, THAT IT IS A CONSTITUTION 
WE ARE EXPOUNDING"22 
When faced with an instruction manual, you must make two 
distinct decisions. First, you must decide whether you want to try 
to understand the instructions that it contains. If the answer is 
yes, this requires interpreting, or "expounding," the manual. 
Second, once you understand (or expound) the instructions, you 
must then decide whether you want to follow them. These are 
conceptually separate inquiries. It is entirely possible to under-
stand the instructions perfectly but simply decide that there is a 
better way to do whatever the instructions concern. Similarly, it 
is possible to try to accomplish the task that you believe the in-
structions have in mind without reading or understanding the in-
structions. This is true of instruction manuals for assembling 
computer tables, for preparing food, and for constructing a par-
ticular form of government. 
Our concern in this article is solely with the task of under-
standing, or expounding, the instruction manual that is the fed-
eral Constitution. We aim to describe the appropriate way to 
read and understand the instructions contained in the Constitu-
tion. We have nothing to say about whether any particular peo-
ple, most notably public officials who carry firearms or command 
people who carry firearms, should try to follow the instructions 
in the Constitution once they are understood. That is a substan-
tial question of political morality, not of interpretative theory, 
and we are not political moralists. (We have enough trouble try-
ing to be interpretative theorists.) All manner of mischief results 
from people leaping from "the Constitution instructs people to 
do X" to "people should do X." In particular, folks who do not 
ingly, we normally specify the precise cognitive context for our statements only when we 
are employing a nonstandard or unusual set of conceptual categories. Anyone who, in 
normal conversation, denies that the Empire State Building is a building is trying either 
to cause trouble or to complete a dissertation. 
21. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 31-32 
(1998). 
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (emphasis altered). 
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much believe that people should do X often go to great lengths 
to misread rather clear instructions to do X contained in the 
Constitution. The world would be a much cleaner and neater 
place if such people simply declared, "The Constitution instructs 
us to do X, but that is a really stupid instruction so we are going 
to do Y instead." So that there is no mistake, we are discussing 
in this article the proper way to interpret and understand the 
Constitution. We are not claiming that those instructions carry 
any moral authority, should be followed by judges or anyone 
else, or represent the best way to assemble a government. We 
come neither to bury nor to praise the Constitution, but merely 
to expound it.23 
Instruction manuals such as the Constitution are communi-
cative instruments that attempt to convey information to human 
minds. As with any form of communication, they can only be 
understand by reference to human intentions?4 In this respect, 
23. For more on the distinction between interpreting the Constitution and following 
the Constitution, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . .. and Constitutions, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1823 (1997). For an argument that the proper interprLtation of the Constitution can-
not be separated from the normative reasons (if any) for following the Constitution, see 
Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Nor-
mative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J. 1857 (1997). For the response, which agrees at one level that 
interpretation is always normative but which locates the normative element solely in the 
standard of proof that one employs, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 11, at 208 n.15. 
For an explanation of why this response is not simply incoherent academic pseudobab-
ble, see a forthcoming article that we have not yet gotten around to writing but probably 
will someday. 
24. We gather that this point is controversial among those who fell trees debating 
meaning, see supra text at 6, but we are not sure why. It is certainly true that it is possible 
to attribute meaning, in some sense, even to the accidental arrangement of tree branches, 
the motions of planets, or the entrails of goats without any accompanying attribution of 
"authorship" or "intention" to the event generating meaning. See MichaelS. Moore, In-
terpreting Interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 15, at 1, 3, 7; Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465 
(2005). But in the context of communication, meaning and intention are linked. If one is 
not trying to understand what an author of a statement intends, one simply is not en-
gaged in the enterprise of communication. If one knows, with mortal certainty, that a cer-
tain text was humanly authored for the purpose of communication (and communication 
in this sense can include one mind speaking to itself or an instruction that is designed to 
be a conversation-stopping command), it is more than a bit odd-and more than a bit 
rude-to try to find the "meaning" of that document in anything other than the commu-
nicative intentions contained within it. This is not a point about strict logic or the neces-
sary meaning of the word "interpretation" (though it would not surprise us if people 
wiser than we wish to make such a point), but rather about the normal human response 
when faced with an act of communication. The fact that academics can dream up exotic 
ways to react to a communicative instrument-for instance, to treat a constitution like an 
arrangement of tree branches or a set of goat entrails- does not mean that that is the 
sensible thing to do. The most sensible and natural response when faced with a commu-
nicative instrument is to try to understand the communication. And if one chooses to en-
gage in the activity of interpreting a communicative act qua communicative act, it is 
senseless-or at the very least bizarre-to do so without reference to the intentions of 
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those who doubt the possibility of purely "intention-free inter-
pretation" of the Constitution seem to be correct.25 The trick is 
to figure out which intentions are the proper foci of attention. 
There are three plausible candidates: the intentions of ac-
tual authors, the intentions of actual readers, or the intentions of 
fictitious authors or readers. The most obvious (though, as we 
shall see, not necessarily the best) of the three would seem to be 
the actual intentions of the document's actual author(s). Who-
ever uses a word or phrase, such as the phrase "executive 
Power" that appears in Article II of the Constitution/6 pre-
sumably has in mind something about the (real or imagined) 
world that he or she is trying to communicate, so the most 
straightforward way to identify that particular something seems 
to be simply to ask -literally or figuratively- the actual speaker 
what that something might be. (One cannot literally ask a dead 
speaker what he or she meant, but one can-and often must, as 
with wills or Shakespearean plays-do so hypothetically and can 
glean answers from evidence left behind by that speaker.) It is 
possible to ask directly whether a specific thing or relation was 
contemplated as part of the reference of a term or phrase, but 
because language aside from proper names is normally general, 
it makes more sense to ask about the intended criteria for the set 
of the referents and then determine whether a specific thing or 
relation is within that set. In the case, for example, of the words 
"executive Power" in Article II of the Constitution, we would 
ask the speaker how we would recognize "executive Power" 
(and distinguish it from a square dance, a unicorn, or legislative 
power) if we came across it. 
Another theoretically possible way to ascertain the meaning 
of a phrase such as "executive Power" is to ask how readers of 
the phrase understand it, which means to determine which refer-
ents various readers of the phrase attribute to it. Any readers 
will of course have to make some assumptions about the mental 
state of the author-e.g., that the author was speaking English,27 
that the author was attempting to communicate rather than doo-
dle pointlessly/8 and that the author was attempting to issue a 
some author. 
25. See WHITIINGTON, supra note 12, at 59, 94--95; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, "Is that English You're Speaking?: Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Im-
possibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1. 
27 .. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 25, at 974-75; Steven Knapp & Walter 
Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 658-59 (2005). 
28. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 25, at 976. 
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legal command rather than compose a poem or inspire aspira-
tions to greatness-and in that sense any "meaning" attributable 
to readers will in fact require significant focus on the intentions 
(real or presumed) of the authors. But there is no reason to sup-
pose that any specific reader will necessarily "map" the phrase 
"executive Power" onto the world of things and relations in pre-
cisely the same fashion as will the author. Assuming that reader 
and author are both speaking the same language, that both are 
relatively fluent in that language, and that the phrase is part of 
the standard vocabulary of ordinary speakers, there is reason to 
think that there will be substantial overlap in the coverage that 
each will give to the phrase, but there is room for divergence at 
the margins. In all likelihood, not everyone in 1788 understood 
"executive Power" in quite the same way. One could perfectly 
well say that once the author's intentions have defined the lan-
guage and form of the communication, those intentions have 
done their work and that the precise scope of the phrase "execu-
tive Power" is then determined by the mental states of some 
reader. One, of course, needs reasons to say this, but one could 
perfectly well say it. 
A third possibility is that meaning depends neither on the 
mental states of any actual authors nor on the thoughts of any 
actual readers, but rather on the mental states that would have 
been held by some person or persons who might or might not 
ever have actually existed under conditions that might or might 
not ever have been actually realized. One can imagine a hypo-
thetical author, a hypothetical reader, or both, and one can 
imagine the part of the world that such a hypothetical person 
would mark off by means of the phrase "executive Power." For 
present purposes, we are not going to distinguish hypothetical 
readers from hypothetical authors. It is not clear that it makes 
any significant difference,29 and our emphasis in this article is on 
the "hypothetical" part of the description. 
For three mutually reinforcing reasons-the Constitution's 
language and structure, the actual authorship and readership of 
the Constitution, and the Constitution's perceived source of au-
thority- the hypothetical approach is superior to either the "ac-
tual authorial intentions" approach or the "actual reader under-
standing" approach.30 We hasten to add that the lines among 
29. As we will explain, in the context of the federal Constitution the relevant hypo-
thetical author and readers are identical. See infra text at 31-32. 
30. There are, of course, other ways to determine the referents of the Constitution's 
language and therefore attach meaning to that language, but none of those methods de· 
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these approaches are not as crisp as we have made them out to 
be. If one believes that authorial intentions are controlling, the 
understandings of actual and/or reasonable readers may well be 
very good, or even the best available, evidence of those inten-
tions. Similarly, if one is looking for the understandings of actual 
readers, the understandings of authors who shared a common 
language and framework with those readers may be very good 
evidence of the readers' understandings. And if one is looking 
for the understandings that would have been held by a reason-
able observer, the understandings of actual observers is at least a 
plausible place to start that inquiry. In a large range of cases, the 
actual understandings of historically real authors, the actual un-
derstandings of historically real readers, and the hypothetical 
understandings of reasonable authors or readers will likely over-
lap.31 But the difference between the object of inquiry and the 
evidence for that object can subtly affect the interpretative proc-
ess, and there may be times when different approaches will yield 
different answers. For instance, it may well be that the vast ma-
jority of actual authors and actual readers of the federal Consti-
tution in 1788 thought that the Treaty Power in Article II was a 
distinct grant of power to the President but that a hypothetical 
author or reader examining the actual document would instead 
conclude that the President's power to negotiate treaties was al-
ready contained in the grant of "executive Power" in the Article 
II Vesting Clause. In the latter case, the Treaty Clause is best 
read as a clarification and qualification of an already-granted 
power rather than as a distinct grant of presidential power, with 
potentially major consequences for the scope of the Treaty 
Power.32 The proper source of intentions can matter a great deal; 
serves to be called "interpretation." See supra note 24. For example, one could say that 
the term "executive Power" has whatever meaning best fits the most attractive moral 
theory that thinkers (whether modern or historical) can devise. But that is not really a 
method of interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution is quite irrelevant, or at least 
incidental, to that enterprise. If one really has a good moral theory, and if one believes 
that such a moral theory is the appropriate basis for governance, why would one possibly 
bother trying to match up that moral theory with the words of the Constitution, which 
probably bear at most a coincidental relationship to that theory? If one tried to map such 
a moral theory onto the menu at a local restaurant, no one (we hope) would seriously 
regard that as an attempt to "interpret" the menu, and it should not be regarded as a se-
rious attempt to "interpret" the Constitution. It may be a very good, or even the best, 
method of social organization, but to call it "interpretation" seems bizarre, or at the very 
least deliberately equivocal. 
31. See Nelson, infra note 72, at 557-58; Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution 
Embody a "Presumption of Liberty"?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 325; Ernest A. Young, 
Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1639 
(2000). 
32. We have elsewhere laid out those consequences at great length. See Gary Law-
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it is worth getting this right. The first place to look for the right 
answer is the Constitution itself. 
C. "WE MUST NEVER FORGET, THAT IT IS A CONSTITUTION 
WE ARE EXPOUNDING" 33 
The Constitution appears to be noticeably silent about its 
own interpretation. It specifies no principles of interpretation. 
Nor does it specifically identify anyone who is expressly charged 
with the task of interpreting the Constitution. Various actors are 
assigned roles and tasks by the Constitution, and many of those 
roles and tasks require, as a necessary incident, that the actor in-
terpret and apply the Constitution, but all such powers of inter-
pretation arise by inference; no clause of the Constitution ex-
pressly grants a power of interpretation.34 
The Constitution does, however, expressly specify its own 
putative authorship. In its very first sentence, the Constitution 
states that 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.35 
The Constitution declares itself to be authored by, and to speak 
on behalf of, "We the People of the United States." As a matter 
of political theory, of course, this declaration is a preposterous 
pretension with no grounding in reality. But we are not inter-
ested in the Constitution's authority or its status as a matter of 
political theory. We are interested in its meaning. And the Con-
stitution's declaration of authorship is directly relevant to that 
inquiry. 
To be sure, the Constitution does not specifically say that it 
is "authored" by "We the People." It says, rather, that it is "or-
dain[ ed) and establish[ ed]"- that is, given effect as a legal in-
strument-by "We the People." But in the context of a legal in-
son & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
33. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (emphasis altered). 
34. On the absence of a specified supreme interpreter, and the consequences of that 
absence, see Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irre-
pressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003). 
35. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
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strument, that is the relevant form of authorship. If the two of us 
went to a stationery store and bought and executed a form 
document for the lease of land, neither one of us would have lit-
erally "authored" the form document in question. Someone who 
works for the company that published the document is the ac-
tual, literal author. Nonetheless, by executing the document, we 
take it on as our own expression. If there is a question about the 
intention behind the lease that we execute, one would not sum-
mon the employee of the publishing company to glean those in-
tentions. Similarly, if a lawyer drafts a will for a client, it is the 
client's intentions that are thought to speak through the will, not 
the lawyer's. The lawyer's job is to channel the client's inten-
tions, not to perform the act of intending. The person who exe-
cutes a legal document assumes a kind of authorship separate 
and distinct from the literal authorship that originally put the 
words of the document together onto paper. In the same respect, 
when the Constitution declares that "We the People" "ordain 
and establish" the Constitution, it declares that "We the People" 
are the legal, even if not the physical, authors of the words con-
tained in the document. According to the Constitution, "We the 
People" are trying to communicate, and the intentions of "We 
the People" are therefore the key to that communication. 
"We the People of the United States," however, is a hypo-
thetical legal construct. The document was not, in literal fact, 
written, read, debated, or ratified by "We the People," and eve-
ryone who ever actually wrote, read, debated, or ratified the 
document had to know this. The document was written, read, 
debated, and eventually ratified by a rather small subset of any 
plausible grouping of "We the People. "36 But if the document is 
to be taken on its own terms, the Constitution clearly identifies 
in whose name it purports to speak, and that is not the histori-
cally real authors or readers of the document. 
The Constitution specifically identifies a set of historically 
real authors as well. The names of thirty nine signatories appear 
at the conclusion of the original Constitution, along with the 
date of authorship.37 But they are, for interpretative purposes, 
36. Akhil Arnar has usefully reminded us that it is easy to overstate the exclusive-
ness of the founding era's constitutional deliberations; by historical standards, those de-
liberations were characterized far more by their remarkable inclusiveness than by almost 
anything else. See Akhil Reed Arnar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671 (2002). But while this 
is an important point to remember both historically and politically, from the standpoint 
of interpretation it only reduces and does not eliminate the gap between the Constitu-
tion's pretensions and its reality. 
37. See U.S. CONST. art. VII ("Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of 
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like the authors of a form lease or a will that is executed by oth-
ers. Those actual authors and readers were part of "We the Peo-
ple," and their concrete understandings are therefore evidence 
of the understandings of the broader grouping in whose name 
the Constitution purports to speak. But a strict reliance on the 
intentions or understandings of the actual authors or readers of 
the Constitution is inconsistent with the terms of the document 
itself, which directs us to its self-declared hypothetical authors. 
Put another way, the clearly expressed intention of the actual au-
thors of the Constitution is to treat the document as though it 
was written by some group called "We the People" even if that is 
factually false. Even if one takes actual historical intentions as 
the touchstone, reliance on those intentions entails reliance on 
hypothetical intentions. All roads lead to the intentions of "We 
the People." 
Of course, the Constitution's declaration of legal authorship 
demonstrates only that the Constitution is best understood from 
a hypothetical perspective of some kind, not that such a perspec-
tive must be that of a reasonable person. In Part II, we under-
take the task of figuring out what these "People" who the Con-
stitution claims as its authors are like and what characteristics 
they possess, including their degree and kind of reasonableness. 
For the moment, the important point is that the Constitution's 
language mandates use of a hypothetical rather than an actual 
source of meaning. If the reasonable person turns out to be a 
good proxy for "We the People," the case for reasonable-person 
originalism has been made. 
Our argument differs significantly from the standard ration-
ale that has been offered for using the reasonable person as the 
touchstone of meaning. That rationale has not focused on the 
Constitution's actual language or claimed authorship, but on its 
presumed status as law. As Justice Scalia has written in oft-
quoted language: 
[T]he reason we adopt this objectified version [of intentions] 
is, I think, that it is simply incompatible with democratic gov-
ernment, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the 
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, 
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to 
me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said 
the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thou-
sand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of 
America the Twelfth. In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names."). 
2006] ORIGINALISM AS A LEGAL ENTERPRISE 61 
to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they 
could not easily be read. Government by unexpressed intent 
is similarly tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent 
of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous 
American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A 
government of laws, not of men. Men may intend what they 
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us. 38 
Justice Scalia has also focused on the practical fear that willful 
judges will often use the search for unexpressed intentions as an 
excuse to make law,39 but that is an argument about institutional 
design and governance rather than an argument about interpre-
tation. 
We are not persuaded that one can defeat strict intentional-
ism as a theory of interpretation based on the nature of law. The 
argument simply begs the question of what law must look like. 
Indeed, there are facially plausible theories of law that ?round 
its authority precisely in the intentions of the lawmaker.4 In ad-
dition, Justice Scalia's argument tries to draw a very tight link 
between theories of meaning and theories of political legitimacy. 
As one of us has attempted to demonstrate at considerable 
length elsewhere, those are two distinct inquiries: What the Con-
stitution means is conceptually separate from whether the Con-
stitution is worth obeying. 41 A constitution or law founded on the 
principle of lawmaker's intentions might well be a bad constitu-
tion or law, but that goes to its authority rather than its meaning. 
We do not categorically rule out the possibility that one might be 
able to construct an argument against strict intentionalism based 
on the nature of law, but we do not ourselves advance that claim 
here. Our argument is based on the actual Constitution that we 
have, not on what an ideal constitution would provide. 
D. AUTHOR, AUTHOR 
Historical facts about the actual authorship and readership 
of the Constitution further suggest that the reasonable person is 
the proper locus of constitutional meaning. The Constitution is a 
collective construction, with many actual authors. This fact in-
38. SCALIA, supra note 11, at 17. 
39. See id. at 17-18. 
40. See WHIITINGTON, supra note 12, at 94-95; Kay, supra note 12, at 246 ("Re-
course to intention is necessary because only certain people have the authority to make 
law."). 
41. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1823 
(1997). 
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creases the relative plausibility of a hypothetical approach to in-
terpretation. 
Reliance on actual, concrete intentions as the source of 
meaning of a communication works best when one is dealing 
with a single individual. Even in that case, there is no direct con-
tact with the mind of the other person, so that the intentions of 
the communicator must be inferred, but inferences of that sort 
are made routinely and easily.42 In a jointly-authored work such 
as this one, the problems increase, because the concrete inten-
tions of the authors may not precisely overlap; when we use a 
word, such as "overlap," in all likelihood the two of us are not 
using it to identify precisely the same things and relations in the 
world. But any divergence between the intentions of authors 
such as we is likely to be very small in a large range of cases-
even if the authors reside 6000 miles apart. For most ordinary 
purposes, it makes perfectly good sense to speak of the "inten-
tions" of the two of us as joint authors, though we will see 
shortly that it is important to understand precisely why and how 
this makes good sense. 
The Constitution was not written by two people. Fifty five 
delegates attended the Convention that produced the Constitu-
tion. People who were not delegates directly or indirectly influ-
enced the drafting process.43 If one regards the delegates at the 
state ratifying conventions as the effective "authors" of the 
document, that number rises to 1,649. The actual readership of 
the Constitution in 1787-88 was much higher than that. As the 
number of minds involved in the process of communication in-
creases, the plausibility of speaking intelligibly of an actual joint 
communicative "intention" seemingly becomes more and more 
remote. Did the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists, the merchants 
of New York, and the backwoods farmers of Virginia all have 
joint intentions with respect to the meaning of the Constitution? 
This problem has been well plumbed. In the 1980s, a verita-
ble cottage industry arose among critics of originalism raising the 
supposed interpretative problems posed by the Constitution's 
multiple authors and readers.44 In its strongest form, the argu-
ment claimed that the problem of "summing" intentions across 
42. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 68...{)9 (1992). 
43. Prominent founding-era figures who were not delegates at the Convention in-
cluded Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, John Jay, Samuel Chase, and Richard Henry 
Lee. 
44. For string citations, see Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 445,456 n.31 (1984); Kay, supra note 12, at 245 n.82. 
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many persons rendered the search for collective intentions liter-
ally impossible. A weaker form would suggest that if an alterna-
tive account of constitutional meaning that does not require such 
summing is available, one ought to consider the alternative. 
The now-classic rebuttal to the strong claim of impossibility 
was offered by Professor Richard Kay in 1988.45 Professor Kay's 
influential response argued that discerning collective intentions 
might be difficult in some c<>.ses but was not conceptually or 
practically impossible. In the context of constitutional meaning, 
the key for Professor Kay was that the actions of certain identifi-
able groups-namely, a majority of the people at a supermajor-
ity of the ratifying conventions that approved the Constitution-
are responsible for making the Constitution authoritative law.46 
Accordingly, Professor Kay maintained, as long as a majority of 
ratifiers at a sufficient majority of the ratifying conventions had 
some degree of overlapping intentions, those areas of overlap 
determined the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision. 
For example, "probably all of the enactors of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments understood that incarceration would be a 
deprivation of liberty requiring due process of law,"47 and one 
can therefore confidently consider this area of agreement part of 
the Constitution's meaning. As long as those areas of agreement 
are robust, there is no insuperable problem for constitutional ad-
judication even if the Constitution simply does not reach outside 
those areas of agreement.48 
45. See Kay, supra note 12, at 245-50. 
46. See id. at 247 ("[T]he authority of the Constitution is conventionally and popu-
larly premised on the understanding that it was the work of 'the People" in their original, 
sovereign capacity. Actually, the role of 'the People' was played by the special ratifying 
conventions in the individual states .... The inquiry into original intent, therefore, 
should focus on the intentions of the various ratifying bodies who possessed tht: constitu-
ent authority."). 
47. !d. at 248. 
48. See id. at 249: 
[W]e should be able to accumulate enough identical intentions to compose an 
authoritative lawmaker. By discerning the language's central paradigm, we can 
define an area of application that was intended by virtually all the relevant indi-
viduals who together constitute the lawmaker. As we move out from this core 
idea to somewhat less obvious applications, we can expect to find fewer indi-
viduals who intend the law to extend so far. Still, as long as it is probable that a 
necessary law-making majority shared a particular understanding it will be ap-
propriate to so interpret the provision. This approach, therefore, requires the 
judge to ask whether the challenged action falls within a mt:aning intended by 
an authoritative lawmaker. Idiosyncratic meanings held by individuals within 
the majority (or by individual law-making bodies) falling outside that shared, 
core intention will not have the force of law because they lack such an authori-
tative source. They may be ignored for the same reasons that we ignore the in-
tentions of the dissenters. 
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The difficulty with Professor Kay's argument is that it starts 
from the premise that the Constitution is authoritatively binding 
law and then constructs a mechanism of meaning based on that 
assumption. The Constitution's authoritativeness, however, is a 
conclusion rather than a premise, and that conclusion can only 
be reached after the meaning of the Constitution is first uncov-
ered. If the Constitution was written by thirty nine people, and 
some small subset of those people held a qualitatively different 
intention than the remaining majority, then from the standpoint 
of actual authorship the Constitution has no discernible mean-
ing. From the standpoint of meaning rather than authority, there 
is no obvious reason to privilege the majority over the minority 
in the case of jointly authored works. The Constitution might 
have had a meaning in the strict authorial sense if it had been 
written by a different set of authors that did not include the dis-
senting voices, but there is nothing in the nature of interpreta-
tion per se that allows one to ignore the intentions of actual au-
thors when one sets out to discover the intentions of actual 
authors. Professor Kay has made an interesting and powerful ar-
gument about political theory, but it is not a convincing account 
of the Constitution's meaning. 
In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in collec-
tive intentions, stimulated largely by debates about statutory in-
terpretation.49 A common theme in these debates, which pro-
vides support for Professor Kay's solution to the problem of 
collective intentions, is that the "intentions" of large groups can 
be reduced to the "intentions" of much smaller sub-groups if the 
group members individually agree that the joint product should 
be understood in this fashion. 50 In the context of the federal 
Constitution, one could say that the intentions of a majority of 
ratifiers represents constitutional meaning because the partici-
pants in the ratification process agreed-i.e., intended-that the 
majority's intentions would represent the intentions of the whole 
group. 
It is certainly possible for individuals in a group to intend 
that their intentions be understood by reference to something 
For a similar argument, see WHITIINGTON, supra note 12, at 96-97. 
49. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role 
of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005); Abby Wright, 
Comment, For All Intents and Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells Us About Con-
gress and Statutory Interpretation, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (2006). 
50. See Solan, supra note 49, at 428 ("We routinely attribute intent to a group of 
people based on the intent of a subset of that group, provided that there is agreement in 
advance about what role the subgroup will play."). 
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other than their actual intentions. Indeed, that is essentially what 
we argued in the previous portion of this article, and it underlies 
the broader account of joint intentions that we are about to pro-
vide. But the "second-order author" whose intentions stand in 
for the real intentions of the real members of the group need not 
be a subgroup of the actual authors. There is a more plausible 
"second-order author" available. 
Strictly speaking, collectives- including very small collec-
tives, such as the two of us-cannot have an intention. Onll sin-
gle minds, whether real or imaginary, can have intentions.5 This 
is a special case of the more general principle that only concrete 
individuals and not groups can act. 52 To be sure, there are phi-
losophical traditions that claim otherwise. As Jeanne Schroeder 
has explained, "[t]here are many intellectual traditions-
Hegelianism for one-that posit that collectives cannot be re-
duced to a mere aggregation of individuals but have unique 
characteristics of their own."53 No one, we think, really claims 
that aggregations of individuals are "mere." When individuals 
get into groups, they often behave differently than when they are 
on their own. But that does not mean that the group has a meta-
physical existence apart from the individuals. Rather, it requires 
one to analyze the behavior of individuals in groups differently 
than one would analyze behavior of individuals in isolation. That 
requirement in no way challenges the basic metaphysics of 
methodological individualism. Whe~ we speak of the intention 
of a group, we do so metaphorically.)4 
The only real solution (as opposed to a palliative) to the 
problem of collective intentions is to take the metaphor seriously 
as a metaphor. The metaphor works by positing the collective as 
a fictitious individual. We anthropomorphize the collective and 
attribute to it a single mind. We act as though it were a concrete 
person able to act in an intentional way.55 Anthropomorphism of 
51. Accord John R. Searle, Col/ecth·e Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN 
COMMUNCATION (Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan & Martha E. Pollack eds., 1990) 401, 
406 ("Since society consists entirely of individuals, there cannot be a group mind or 
group consciousness. All consciousness is in individual minds, in individual brains."). 
52. See Lawson, supra note 42, at 59-DO. 
53. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 351,389 (2001). 
54. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 434 
(2005) ("Legislative intent, to the extent textualists invoke it, is a framework of analysis 
designed to satisfy the minimum conditions for meaningful communication by a multi-
member body without actual intentions to judges, administrators, and the public, who all 
form a community of shared conventions for decoding language in context."). 
55. See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 
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this kind is especially plausible, and especially necessary, with 
respect to legal documents, which only function well when they 
speak with one voice, even if the process which generated that 
voice was messy and divisive. Many disciplines prosper by find-
ing questions. Law works best when it finds answers. 
This anthropomorphism is not, one must note, some mysti-
cal war, of attributing metaphysical status to an actual "group 
mind." 6 Quite to the contrary, it is an epistemological tool for 
dealing with the fact that people engaged in joint enterprises, 
operating within the same objective reality, might have similar 
but nonidentical conceptual frameworks that lead to perhaps 
subtle differences in individual meaning. It is theoretically possi-
ble to try, as do Professoi Kay and others, to find the core of ob-
jects and relations that each and every one of the joint authors 
has in mind by using a particular word or phrase and to limit 
joint meaning only to those objects and relations held in com-
mon, and over a certain range of authors and communicative 
acts, this strategy may be plausible. But as the number of authors 
rises, the plausibility of such a strategy starts to depreciate very 
quickly-and any reasonable group of authors must be aware of 
this fact. A group of joint authors sets loose upon the world a 
text that would be difficult or impossible to interpret if each and 
every author's conceptual framework has to be plumbed. It is far 
more plausible to attribute to such a group of joint authors the 
intention-the common intention, if you will-to have the work 
product interpreted as though it emerged from a single author 
with a single intention. The final result may not match up pre-
cisely with what any specific author would have meant had he or 
she been the sole author, and in that sense the attribution of 
meaning to joint authorsh~ involves a certain element of crea-
tion as well as attribution,5 but that is the price that one pays for 
the benefits of joint authorship. 
1, 26-33 (1980). 
56. For a criticism of this very different kind of anthropomorphism, in which we do 
not engage, see WHITIINGTON, supra note 12, at 163-64. 
57. See Heidi Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 15, at 405, 423. Dean Hurd objects to this anthropomorphism because 
"[a]nthropomorphic intentionalism thus stands to intentionalism as hypothetical consent 
stands to actual consent. Just as a rapist could hardly defend himself by claiming hypo-
thetical consent on the part of his victim, so a judge could hardly claim an allegiance to 
legislative intent if she resolved conflicts between the particular intentions of legislators 
by assigning them new ones." ld. Dean's Hurd's objection, however, pertains to the au-
thority of anthropomorphized intentions rather than to their epistemological status as the 
source of meaning of jointly authored works. And, of course, if the best understanding of 
the actual intentions of joint authors is that their work be understood by reference to an-
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The meaning of a jointly authored text is therefore some-
thing (at least potentially) different from the meaning intended 
by any of the individual joint authors. It represents- in its cumu-
lative, "common" form- the non-specific "intentions" of a ficti-
tious author who is constructed to represent, however imper-
fectly, the actions of the real authors. If the real authors have 
used language carefully, any divergence between their individual 
intentions and the "intentions" of the collective product will 
likely be small. But the real authors have brought into the world 
something that literally has meaning only because we can posit a 
hypothetical author to take their places. 
The actual authors of the Constitution brought into being 
precisely such a joint product. Indeed, they did so in dramatic 
fashion through a collaborative, cooperative, deliberative effort 
that involved considerable discussion, negotiation, and compro-
mise. Once that joint product is put forth into the world, inter-
preters can then act as though the Constitution was the product 
of a single mind. That hypothetical mind may well have been try-
ing to mediate among the competing goals and desires of a great 
many people, and the end product of that mind perhaps should 
be understood in light of such a task when one tries to ascertain 
its degree of coherence, but the nature of the Constitution's au-
thorship dictates use of some hypothetical perspective for inter-
pretation. The Constitution's use of the construct of "We the 
People of the United States" as its putative source thus reflects 
the underlying reality that the meaning of the Constitution can-
not be found inside the minds of the historically real authors (or 
readers) but must instead be determined by reference to an an-
thropomorphized abstraction.58 If we are even close to right 
about this, then the actual historical drafters of the Constitution, 
by insisting that the Constitution be interpreted by reference to 
the intentions of "We the People of the United States," were not 
merely wise in the ways of human behavior,59 but were also (to 
paraphrase Miguelito Loveless) pretty fair metaphysicians in the 
bargain. 
thropomorphized intentions, as is true of the federal Constitution, the objection is weak-
ened still further. 
58. Randy Barnett has pointed out that, properly speaking, one should therefore 
refer to "We the People of the United States" in the singular rather than the plural. See 
BARNEIT, supra note 11, at 13 n.l6. We nonetheless generally use the plural form in this 
Article because we find it to be cleaner grammatically, though we will occasionally treat 
"We the People" as a singular noun when it seems more analytically appropriate. 
59. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Foreword: Two Visions of the Nature 
of Man, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1993). 
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E. "WE THE GUN OWNERS OF THE UNITED STATES" 
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the use of hypotheti-
cal rather than actual intentions as the touchstone of constitu-
tional meaning is that it divorces the Constitution from its most 
plausible source of authority in the actions of real persons gen-
erally recognized as having the real power to enact binding law. 
Why should anyone who is trying to operate a government care 
about the legally constructed mental states of a hypothetical en-
tity? 
We have repeatedly pointed out a crucial mistake in this ar-
gument: It begs the question about the Constitution's authority. 
The Constitution has meaning whether or not it has any authority 
as a matter of political theory. Indeed, under any remotely plau-
sible theory of authority, one would need to know the Constitu-
tion's meaning before deciding whether it has any authority. It 
may well be, when the dust settles, that no one will or should 
care about the Constitution's meaning. But one might as well 
make that judgment with the meaning in hand. 
Furthermore, the brute fact of the Constitution's wide-
spread acceptance as authoritative law supports rather than con-
tradicts the use of "We the People" as the source of constitu-
tional meaning. The Constitution did not become authoritative 
in practice (whether or not authoritative in theory) because of 
the actions of its historically real authors or ratifiers. 
One of the most remarkable features of the Constitution 
was its quick acceptance by former opponents upon ratification. 
The ratification process was hard fought, with strong accusations 
flung by both sides. Opponents of the Constitution feared tyr-
anny; from their standpoint, adoption of the Constitution would 
essentially undo the effects of the American Revolution.60 To 
compound matters, the Constitution proclaimed a ratification 
method that required the assent of only nine states instead of the 
unanimous consent of all thirteen as was specified in the Articles 
of Confederation.61 People who were inclined to fight against 
what they perceived as a new tyranny had plenty of intellectual 
resources on which to draw. Shays' Rebellion demonstrated that 
the material resources for armed uprisings were readily present 
as well. The new federal government could not possibly have an 
60. See DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING THE REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND 
FEDERALISTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 9-10 (2002). 
61. For a frank acknowledgement of this problem, see THE FEDERALIST No. 40 
(James Madison) (1787). 
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overwhelming military force until the government had been up 
and running for some time. Recent events cast great doubt on 
the Constitution's durability: The Articles of Confederation had 
failed within a very short time, and state constitutions were 
changing with astonishing rapidity. The process by which the 
Constitution was brought into bein¥ seemed to contain the in-
gredients of a very bloody civil war.6 
It never happened. Almost uniformly, the opponents of the 
Constitution quickly and publicly assented to the new regime, 
and many of them took positions in the federal government or 
the old state governments that required constitutionally-
mandated oaths-and oaths actually meant something to politi-
cians in those days-to preserve the new constitutional order. 
The ordinary citizens who opposed the Constitution, including 
those who dominated certain regions of the country, did not take 
up arms against those who they regarded as usurpers and ene-
mies of liberty, even though the new government had either no 
or a very weak army for much of this time. The transition from 
the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution was spectacu-
larly peaceful and smooth. 
The reasons for this remarkable (and not at all inevitable) 
transition, involving a combination of theoretical concerns about 
law and practical concerns about order held by Antifederalists, 
have been well developed in an important study by David Sie-
mers.63 We might have more to say about this process in a later 
work. For now, our focus is on how the post-ratification process 
of acceptance bears on constitutional meaning. 
The Constitution became authoritative as a matter of social 
fact because people generally did not shoot at the officials of the 
new government. If they had done so, the new government 
would have crumbled, at least in certain regions in which the po-
tential shooters were substantial in number.64 From that stand-
point, the relevant historical actors who accounted for the Con-
stitution's authority were all of the people-many of whom had 
publicly opposed significant provisions of the Constitution-who 
could have revolted but did not. The concrete intentions that 
mattered for constitutional acceptance were therefore the inten-
tions of all of the people who could have mustered arms against 
the new regime. As a practical matter, it is therefore impossible 
62. See SIEMERS, supra note 60, at 39-40. 
63. See id. at 9-17, 25-46. 
64. See id. at 39-40. 
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to use the actual intentions of those who made the Constitution 
authoritative: Those intentions are too numerous, too disparate, 
and too unknowable to make the enterprise even conceivable. 
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL OBSERVER DEFINED 
Once attention is focused on the need to interpret the Con-
stitution from the standpoint of a hypothetical figure, the hard 
task is determining the characteristics of that hypothetical figure 
so that his or her mental states can be appropriately constructed. 
Is that person an author or a reader? Is that person of extraordi-
nary or average intelligence? What assumptions is that person 
going to make when interpreting a legal text? 
A full answer to these questions is the major part of a com-
plete theory of constitutional interpretation. Perhaps someday 
we will attempt such an enterprise, but today is not someday. 
Our more modest goal here is to outline the way in which such 
an enterprise should progress. 
A. WE THE PEOPLE 
The question of hypothetical author versus hypothetical 
reader can be answered quite easily: It makes no difference 
whatsoever because the declared author and target audience of 
the Constitution are exactly the same. 
The Constitution declares itself to be written by "We the 
People of the United States." For whom is that Constitution 
written? To what audience is the Constitution directed? The ob-
vious answer is: "We the People of the United States." 
The Constitution, as we have said, is an instruction manual 
for a form of government authored in the legal sense by "We the 
People of the United States." The target audience for that man-
ual is "We the People of the United States." The instructions 
contained in the Constitution are not directed to the people of 
France, England, or Russia, nor simply to the officials or judges 
of the new American government. They are directed to the peo-
ple-all of the people-who were expected to carry out those in-
structions. The anthropomorphized author of the Constitution is 
the same as its anthropomorphized audience. The Constitution, 
in this respect, is something in the nature of a "memo to self" 
written by "We the People of the United States." The interpreta-
tive task is therefore to figure out the hypothetical characteris-
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tics of this "We the People of the United States" who both 
"wrote" the Constitution and are its target audience. 
A second property of the hypothetical person denoted by 
"We the People of the United States" can also be determined 
readily: That person "exists" at the moment of the creation of 
the Constitution. With respect to the original Constitution, that 
means that "We the People" are represented by a hypothetical 
mind existing in the late eighteenth century. This conclusion 
does not require any special reference to the Constitution. Reli-
ance on original rather than current or evolving meanings for in-
terpreting a text is simply, as Professor Saikrishna Prakash has 
aptly termed it, a "Default Rule" of human communication.65 
The written character of the Constitution reinforces this default 
rule.66 It is always possible, of course, for the original meaning of 
a text to specify (implicitly or explicitly) that it is to be under-
stood in light of current or evolving meanings, but one would 
only reach that conclusion by first referring to the original mean-
ing. We suspect that this obvious proposition is even remotely 
controversial only because most people assume that the meaning 
of the Constitution has normative consequences, and it is not at 
all obvious why old meanings should drive current practice. But 
from a purely interpretative perspective, originalism is a given. 
"No one, we trust, would ever think of interpreting the Confed-
erate Constitution or the original corporate charter for Rhode 
Island according to contemporary public meanings, evolving so-
cial values, or any interpretative method other than some variant 
of original public meaning. "67 
In addition to the standard default rule, the Constitution it-
self is very clear about its own place in time. As we have noted,68 
the actual authors carefully dated the document as of September 
17, 1787. The Constitution contains a specific reference to the 
year 1808.69 Far from altering the "originalist" default rule for 
communication, the Constitution confirms it. Again, it is concep-
tually possible that first-order use of original meaning could re-
quire second-order use of a different temporal perspective in 
some cases, but that conclusion would have to be reached 
through the use of original meaning. 
65. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unorigina/ism's Law Without Meaning, 15 Co:-;sT. 
COMMENT. 529, 541 (1998). 
66. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 100--07. 
67. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 11, at 9. 
68. See supra note 37. 
69. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 1. 
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So what can we say about an anthropomorphized "We the 
People of the United States" in the late eighteenth century? The 
actual people of that time varied greatly across many important 
dimensions. They had vastly different educations and intelli-
gence. They may have differed in the hermeneutical traditions 
that they followed. They may have had very different views 
about the appropriate role and scope of reason in human affairs. 
Any such differences could profoundly affect the way that peo-
ple engaged in interpretation-of a Constitution or anything 
else. What was the perspective of "We the People of the United 
States?" 
We can glean considerable information about "We the Peo-
ple of the United States" by examining their handiwork. The 
memo to self in our possession reveals a great deal about its au-
thor. For starters, "We the People of the United States" obvi-
ously had a high degree of intelligence and education. It is im-
possible to read the Constitution without coming away with a 
profound admiration for its intricacy, interconnectedness, so-
phistication, and solid grounding in articulable and plausible as-
sumptions about human behavior. If this was what "We the Peo-
ple of the United States" memorialized in a memo to self, "We 
the People of the United States" was one smart cookie. 
"We the People" also exhibits a strong commitment to hu-
man reason. There is good historical warrant for attributing such 
a commitment to a hypothetical person of the late eighteenth 
century/0 and the Constitution confirms that commitment in its 
putative author. The sheer (for lack of a better term) audacity 
represented by the attempt to write down, in technical detail, a 
blueprint for a form of government attests to a deep apprecia-
tion of the power and possibility of human reason. Even more 
tellingly, the absence of any specification in the Constitution of a 
supreme or authoritative interpreter reflects the view that an-
swers will emerge for those who make the effort to find them. A 
regime of multiple interpreters is a testament to faith in reason. 
In addition, "We the People of the United States" is learned 
in the law. The Constitution is a legal document-and a legal 
document of considerable sophistication. It uses much language 
that would have been quite familiar to lawyers of the late eight-
eenth century.71 Whether or not "We the People" was actually a 
70. For a study of the role of reason in the founding generation, see SMITH, supra 
note 21. 
71. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and 
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lawyer, he or she was conversant with legal traditions and con-
ventions of the time. 
In sum, the hypothetical "We the People of the United 
States" is a pretty good fit with the reasonable person of the law. 
This person is highly intelligent and educated and capable of 
making and recognizing subtle connections and inferences. This 
person is committed to the enterprise of reason, which can pro-
vide a common framework for discussion and argumentation. 
This person is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual 
structure of the law. "We the People of the United States" is a 
formidable intellectual figure. 
The devil, as always, is in the details. The difficult questions 
of interpretation concern the specific interpretative conventions 
and presumptions that "We the People of the United States," as 
a reasonable person, would employ in difficult cases. The range 
of issues to be resolved has been elegantly surveyed by Caleb 
Nelson in his (should-be-if-it-is-not-already) classic study of 
founding era interpretative conventions.72 A complete theory of 
interpretation must address those issues. For now, however, it is 
enough to establish that constitutional meaning is found in the 
hypothetical mind of the reasonable person identified by the 
Constitution as "We the People of the United States." 
B. THEY THE PEOPLE? 
The Constitution of 1788 defines its own putative author-
ship. Interpretation of the Constitution of 1788 must therefore 
take place by reference to the hypothetical 1788 author specified 
in the document. But what about amendments to the Constitu-
tion? Is the meaning of a constitutional amendment passed in 
1791, or 1868 or 1971, determined by reference to actual inten-
tions of actual authors, or do the arguments for hypothetical au-
thorship apply to those post-1788 texts as well? 
There are two plausible answers, and neither refers to the 
actual intentions of actual authors. One possible answer is that 
Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2005) (tracing the language of the Sweep-
ing Clause to conceptions of agency law that would have been well known to eighteenth 
century private lawyers); cf LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 11, at 51-57 (tracing the 
language of the Sweeping Clause to the principle of reasonableness that would have been 
well known to eighteenth century public lawyers). 
72. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. On. L. REV. 
519, 563-78 (2003); see also Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amend-
ment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 175-78 (2000) (raising 
similar questions about interpretative conventions). 
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the hypothetical author at the time of enactment of an amend-
ment determines the meaning of that amendment. In such a case, 
however, the characteristics of that hypothetical author are up 
for grabs. The author does not necessarily share the same level 
of intelligence, sophistication, or education or the same interpre-
tative presuppositions as does "We the People of the United 
States" circa 1788. On this understanding, each amendment 
could potentially require its own unique interpretative analysis. 
A second possible answer, as strange as it may seem at first 
glance, is that amendments to the Constitution, even amend-
ments enacted in 1971, should be interpreted as though they 
were enacted by "We the People of the United States" circa 
1788. That is, the level of education, assumptions about the role 
of reason, and interpretative conventions that establish meaning 
for all constitutional amendments might be fixed in stone, at 
least as default rules, by the Constitution of 1788. 
Whichever of these two options proves to be correct, it is 
not possible to rely upon actual intentions of actual authors, for 
reasons similar to those that apply to the original Constitution. 
Constitutional amendments, no less than the Constitution of 
1788, are the product of the joint action of many people. Ratify-
ing conventions and state legislatures cannot have intentions ex-
cept in a metaphorical sense. Reliance upon actual intentions is 
literally impossible. More significantly, the constitutional text 
mandates use of hypothetical rather than real intentions for 
amendments as well as for the original text. Article V declares 
that upon ratification amendments "shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution."73 Article V thus 
makes amendments part of precisely the same document ("this 
Constitution") that is authored, according to the Preamble, by 
"We the People of the United States." The internal rules of the 
document, including its interpretative rules, therefore apply to 
amendments just as much as to the original text (unless there is 
something in the amendment itself that alters the basic default 
rule). 
The interesting question is whether "We the People" as-
sumes a different set of characteristics when the meaning of 
amendments is at stake. The difference can be very important. 
We have a great deal of information about the author of the 
Constitution of 1788 from examining the document itself. We 
glean much less information from a provision that reads: 
73. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
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Section 1 
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of age. 
Section 2 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.74 
If this is the only text left behind by that particular author, we 
know that he or she is relatively fluent in English and is gener-
ally conversant with the rest of the Constitution (because the 
provision uses many terms and phrases employed in similar ways 
elsewhere in the document), but not a whole lot beyond that. We 
can, of course, situate the hypothetical author historically and 
make some assumptions about his or her characteristics based on 
general knowledge of authors of the time. Those characteristics 
might be very different than the characteristics of "We the Peo-
ple" circa 1788 with respect to such important matters as atti-
tudes towards reason, interpretative conventions in general, in-
terpretative conventions with regard to constitutions in 
particular, and so forth. A hypothetical American constitutional 
author in 1971 is different in many ways from a hypothetical 
American constitutional author in 1788. If the perspective of 
1971 controls the meaning of the Twenty Sixth Amendment, the 
person whose understandings determine meaning may or may 
not be a "reasonable person" as we have been using that phrase. 
Where in time one locates the proper perspective can mat-
ter a great deal. Consider the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Their operative language is nearly 
identical, but they are separated in time by 77 years. The under-
standing of the phrase "due process of law" held by a reasonable 
person in 1791 could be very different than the understanding of 
the same phrase held by a reasonable person in 1868. If the Due 
Process Clause of 1868 is best understood by reference to 1791 
interpretative conventions, it might well have a very different 
meaning than reasonable people in 1868 would have imagined. 
Though the matter is hardly free of doubt, we offer the sug-
gestion that the reasonable person of 1788-the original "We the 
People of the United States" -is the reference point for all in-
74. !d. amend. XXVI. 
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terpretative issues until the document itself otherwise specifies. 
By designating amendments as part of "this Constitution"- the 
Constitution that, by its own terms, was authored by "We the 
People of the United States" in 1788-the Constitution estab-
lishes a uniform standard for interpretation. The Constitution 
provides for unity across time between original texts and subse-
quent amendments. 75 It would be entirely possible, of course, for 
one or more of those amendments to provide a different inter-
pretative rule, either for particular amendments or for the 
document as a whole. But in the absence of any such stipulation, 
the interpretative rules generally applicable to the Constitution 
apply to all of its parts, including those parts that are added by 
Article V. 
III. LA WYERS VICfORIOUS76 
How one interprets the Constitution determines who should 
be doing the interpreting. It seems largely to have escaped the 
notice of legal scholars that, under many of the most widely ad-
vocated modes of interpretation other than the mode put for-
ward in this article, lawyers and legal scholars are fairly low 
down the list of plausible constitutional interpreters. The gap be-
tween interpretative theory and lawyerly expertise is perhaps 
most pronounced in the case of originalist theories other than 
our own, but many nonoriginalist theories also have implications 
for the interpretative role of lawyers. 
Suppose that one believes, as do many modern observers, 
that constitutional meaning depends to some extent on norma-
tive considerations- that is, that the meaning of the Constitution 
turns (at least in significant measure) on what a morally good 
Constitution would say. Under this approach, the people best 
qualified to interpret the Constitution are obviously the people 
who are best qualified to determine what is morally good. 
There is no plausible theory of which we are aware under 
which lawyers or legal scholars (who we will henceforth refer to 
collectively as "lawyers") fit that description. There is nothing in 
the training, background, or demonstrated abilities of lawyers 
75. In order to address this topic adequately, we would of course need to address 
competing theories that call for a different integration of original text with subsequent 
amendments. See, e.g, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCfiON (1998) (arguing, inter alia, that the original text must sometimes be 
reinterpreted in light of amendments). 
76. With apologies to J.K. Rawling and Severus Snape. 
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that would inspire any confidence in their superior abilities to 
identify moral truth. They are not necessarily inferior to anyone 
else in their moral capacities, but they certainly have no claim to 
superiority. Moral philosophers, based on their training and 
background, have a facially better claim to the role of primary 
constitutional interpreter if moral truth is relevant to the inquiry, 
but their actual performance over time does not warrant grant-
ing them any privileged status. The same goes for lawyers who 
have formal training in moral philosophy; there is nothing in ex-
perience to suggest that such a background generates deeper 
perception of moral truth than does, e.g, regular attendance at 
religious services, a good upbringing, or a careful re-reading of 
Atlas Shrugged. For people who subscribe to a particular reli-
gious view of morality, perhaps recognized authorities in that re-
ligious tradition should have the paramount role in constitu-
tional interpretation, though any such role will be confined to 
adherents of that particular tradition. 
It may well be that no one is qualified to interpret the Con-
stitution if the document's meaning depends in any strong way 
on moral truth. This conclusion does not depend on any pro-
found skepticism about moral truth, but only on skepticism 
about the ~ualifications of any identifiable group of people to 
discover it. At the very least, for any theory of interpretation 
that requires moral judgment, lawyers stand in no better position 
than "nine people picked at random from the Kansas City tele-
phone directory."78 It is a slight exaggeration to say that if consti-
tutional interpretation depends on moral considerations, then 
lawyers have nothing useful to contribute to the enterprise. But 
it is only a slight exaggeration. 
One possible attraction of some forms of originalism is that 
they seem to obviate the need to discover moral truth. Why 
worry about normative matters when the relevant value judg-
ments are already contained in the document? 79 But the forms of 
77. For a quick overview of the carnage wrought by legal scholars attempting to do 
normative theory, see Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 727,775--83 (1988). 
78. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
79. Similar considerations support the practice of "common law constitutionalism," 
in which constitutional meaning is found primarily in the practices that take place in the 
name of the Constitution. The relevant value judgments arc contained in those practices 
rather than in abstract reasoning. For an especially clear and sophisticated presentation 
of this model, sec David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). Common-law constitutionalism, unlike theories of interpreta-
tiOn based on moral reasoning, prescribes a major role for lawyers; who better than law-
78 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:47 
originalism that rely on historically real mental states rather than 
the views of the reasonable person also leave only a very limited 
role for lawyers and legal scholars in the interpretative process. 
If meaning is to be found in the actual mental states of some set 
of historical figures- whether it be the Framers, the ratifiers, or 
any subset of the actually existing public-lawyers have no privi-
leged insight into those mental states. 
There are professionals who devote their lives and training 
to the identification of historically real mental states. Historians 
spend much of their energy developing the context in which his-
torically situated figures acted and identifying the forces that 
would likely have shaped their thoughts and actions. Psycholo-
gists specialize in the inner workings of the mind. Linguists study 
the actual uses of language. Other professionals, such as semioti-
cians, study other aspects of the communicative process. If one is 
really trying to identify, as an historical fact, the thoughts that 
were going through the heads of concrete persons at a particular 
point in time and space, one would need to draw on the exper-
tise of historians, psychologists, linguists, semioticians, and a host 
of other professionals who can each contribute a piece of the 
puzzle involved in reconstructing the thoughts of a conscious 
mind. If the person whose thoughts are being reconstructed was 
him- or herself a lawyer, or was learned in the law, then lawyers 
might well have something important to contribute to the in-
quiry as well; they might know something important about the 
likely context and framework within which the subject formed 
thoughts. But identifying historically real thoughts is a task for 
expertise, and in most cases it is not at all clear why lawyers 
would think that such expertise belongs to them. 
Lawyers do, of course, have a plausible role in an originalist 
interpretative approach that searches for historically real mental 
states, though it is a very different role than they usually play. 
The law often deals with matters well beyond the expertise of 
lawyers, ranging from the causes of heart attacks to the value of 
close corporations. Those matters are properly the subject of ex-
pert testimony. The task of lawyers in such matters is to marshal 
yers, after all, to understand and interpret the practices of other lawyers? But common-
law constitutionalism works much better as a description of actual practice or prescrip-
tion for effective governance than as a theory of constitutional interpretation. Common-
law constitutionalists interpret a great many things-past decisions, social practices, 
evolving customs and traditions, etc.-but the Constitution of the United States is not 
one of those things. It serves no purpose other than to invite equivocation to call com-
mon-law constitutionalism a method of interpreting the Constitution. 
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and channel the relevant experts and to translate their conclu-
sions into the specialized language of the law. A lawyer could, on 
his or her own, describe the legal context in which decisions 
about scientific causation or economic value are made, identify a 
range of considerations that are part of that inquiry, and set out 
the framework into which expert testimony on such matters 
must be plugged. But a lawyer could not, on his or her own, de-
termine causation or value. The lawyer facilitates the inquiry but 
cannot unilaterally conclude it. 
Similarly, if constitutional meaning is found in historically 
real mental states, lawyers can describe the legal context in 
which decisions about constitutional meaning are made, identify 
a range of considerations that are part of that inquiry, and set 
out the framework into which expert testimony on such matters 
must be plugged. But a lawyer could not, on his or her own, de-
termine constitutional meaning. That ultimate conclusion would 
be the province of experts, of whom the lawyer qua lawyer is not 
one. The lawyer is still necessary in order to marshal and channel 
the evidence produced from experts. It is doubtful whether any 
one expert, in either history, psychology, linguistics, or any other 
relevant field, would possess all of the information needed for an 
accurate assessment of real mental states. The lawyer's job 
within this interpretative framework is to assemble the pieces-
"assemble" in the sense both of "gather" and of "put together." 
That is an important job, to be sure. But it does not involve mak-
ing pronouncements about constitutional meaning without reli-
ance upon experts in mental reconstruction. Under this model of 
originalism, the central resources in constitutional interpretation 
do not come from the law, and the central actors in interpreta-
tion are not lawyers. 
It is fair to say that, under a mode of interpretation that 
looks for actual mental states, legal scholarship is appropriately 
the handmaiden of historical, psychological, linguistic, and other 
professional scholarship. The law sorts and assembles the mate-
rials of interpretation, but it does not itself provide them. Consti-
tutional scholars would need to see themselves primarily as 
transmission belts for the findings of other experts. 
If, however, constitutional meaning is found in the hypo-
thetical mind of the reasonable person denoted by "We the Peo-
ple of the United States," the role of lawyers is potentially more 
robust. "We the People of the United States," as a species of the 
reasonable person, is a legal construct rather than an historical 
individual. The intentions or thoughts of "We the People of the 
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United States" are also legal constructs. Lawyers create the ob-
ject of interpretation, so it is not surprising that lawyers might 
play a key role in understanding it. 
Professionals such as historians, psychologists, and linguists, 
of course, have an important role to play even in identifying the 
hypothetical mental states of the reasonable person. In order to 
know what mental states can most appropriately be attributed to 
the reasonable person, it helps to know the mental states that 
were most likely held by real persons situated in the same point 
in space and time. All of the evidence that establishes the mean-
ing of the Constitution under a concrete-intent-based approach 
to interpretation is relevant to establishing the meaning of the 
Constitution under a reasonable-person-based approach. The 
lawyer seeking the thoughts of the reasonable person ignores 
historians, psychologists, and linguists at considerable peril. But 
rather than merely marshalling, channeling, and assembling the 
data provided by experts, the lawyer under reasonable-person 
originalism must also engage in an affirmative act of construc-
tion. There is a step in the process beyond explaining what the 
experts have found. And the lawyer is well positioned for that 
task. The only direct evidence we have about the thoughts of 
"We the People of the United States" is the memo to self known 
as the Constitution that "We the People" authored and left us. 
The person best equipped to identify the thoughts of such an au-
thor is the person who has taken the time, energy, and care to 
read the product of those thoughts. One certainly does not need 
to be a lawyer in order to engage in that enterprise. Because, 
however, the Constitution is a legal document drafted in legal 
terms for legal purposes, a legal background is helpful, if not 
strictly indispensable, to understanding the Constitution. At the 
very least, a legal background is as or more important to the in-
terpretative enterprise as is a background in history, psychology, 
moral theory, or any other specialized discipline. 
A careful reading of the Constitution will, of course, be in-
formed by insights from disciplines such as history, psychology, 
and linguistics. But the raw material is there for anyone to see. 
Understanding the thoughts of "We the People" is not a distinc-
tively historical, psychological, or linguistic task. It is an act of 
legal construction, based on a legal document, using legal lan-
guage, in a legal context. For lack of a better description, it is a 
legal enterprise. 
